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Possible Effects of Nuclear Power
Reactor Accidents on Agriculture
by M. C. Bell and Sharon L. Bell
Animal Science Department,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
than five percent of the population. Over 75 percent of
the population in many of the developing countries are
involved in food and fiber production. Most developing
countries do not produce sufficient food for their own
use while we export our surplus of over half of our food
grains in order to pay for some of our expensive imports
such as oil. Also, some of our food exports are gifts to
feed starving people throughout the world. To continue
a viable agriculture we need a continuous supply of
energy from whatever sources are available. We need to
continue to produce food which is relatively safe from
risk to humans. This safety should be considered in relation to the other risks in life. People, dairy farms and
power plants go hand-in-hand in this country because
where the people are, there is a need for food and a need
for energy. In fact, over 75 percent of the United States'
total milk cows are located in states with one or more
operating nuclear power reactors (Halsey 1980c). The
stress on milk in this report is because milk is the
primary route of radionuclide contamination in the
food chain to humans.
Dairy product consumption in the United States was
329 pounds per capita last year (Anon. 1979), which is
about 27 percent of the total volume of diet for the
general population (Shleien et al. 1977). The dairy farms
which supply this need are located near the greatest
population centers. The Northeast with its heavily
populated areas counts two of the top ten dairyproducing states in its ranks; the Midwest has eight of
these. Along with the high dairy production, these areas
account for over 63 percent of the total U.S. nuclear
power plants in operation. In the Midwest there are 22
nuclear power plants and in the Northeast there are 23
nuclear power plants (Anon. 1980). These are followed
by the South with 20 plants, the West and Northwest
with six and the Southwest with none. The maps that
follow illustrate the definite relationship between the
location of dairy cows and nuclear power rectors in this
country (figures 1 and 2).

ABSTRACT
Nuclear power reactors are producing electricity in
the United States and throughout the world. From the
data available, the nuclear power reactor industry appears to be as safe if not safer than most other industries
for the production of electricity. A popular misconception is that nuclear reactors will explode like an atomic
bomb. Danger to humans appears to have been much
less than anticipated from the Three Mile Island accident. Protective Action Guides (PAG's) have been
established for action in the event of major nuclear accidents. PAGs were not exceeded at Three Mile Island.
The possibility of major contamination
of the
agricultural community downwind from a nuclear
power plant appears to be unlikely. In the event of action on PAGs, radioactive isotopes of iodine through
the food chain to humans are the radioactive isotopes of
primary concern. These could enter by way of milk
from grazing cows and from fresh leafy vegetables produced downwind from the accident. Other routes of entry are not worth considering. Radioactive cesium could
be volatilized but not to the extent of iodine. Radioactive strontium is less apt to be released. The noble gases
krypton and xenon and the heavy metals such as
uranium and plutonium are not absorbed and retained
by humans and animals so they are of no real threat to
agricultural food chains to humans. In comparison with
natural background radiation, medical uses of radiation
sources and other sources of radioactivity, the added
amount of radiation from nuclear reactor power production is very small, amounting to less than 111Jo
of the
natural background, even at Three Mile Island accident
vicinity.
Countermeasures for the agricultural community
would consist of removing all milk-producing animals
from pasture and giving stored feed where PAG action
is required. Milk above safe levels would be stored until
safe, diverted to other uses or simply dispersed with
waste water. Fresh leafy vegetables could be washed,
outer leaves removed or destroyed if levels are unsafe.
Good judgement and a cool head would be helpful in
times when a few doomsday prophets are flooding the
media with rumors and data which are not applicable to
nuclear reactor accidents.

Nuclear power reactors are already a reality in providing part of our electrical energy demands. It is one of
the many workable energy sources which we have continued to explore and develop. A nuclear power reactor
simply heats water, making steam which drives a turbine
of a generator, thus producing electricity (Kemeny
1979). Nuclear power reactor risks have been continually brought to our attention with inconsistent and
sometimes sensationalized information being presented.
It is not an energy alternative which we should discard
because of emotional hysteria; rather, it should be con-

INTRODUCTION
Production of food and fiber in the United States
depends upon an advanced technology involving less
3
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Figure 1. Nuclear power reactors in the United States, including reactors licensed to operate, being built and
planned. (Halsey 198Oc)
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Vinca, Yugoslavia - October 15, 1958. An accident
at Vinca, a suburb of Belgrade, occurred at a zeropower reactor built for experimental purposes (Savic
1959). The accident involved a brief uncontrolled run at
the assembly, allowed to go undetected because of the
lack of an interlock system and the fact that the safety
circuits and monitors were turned off at the time.
At the time of supercriticality, eight persons were in
the immediate area around the tank and were exposed to
very large doses of neutrons and ionizing radiation
(Anon. 1960b). Total body radiation absorbed internally was between 300 and 1500 roentgens (Anon. 1959).
With a dose of 400 to 500 roentgens considered lethal in
50 percent of cases exposed (Anon. 1960b), the amount
received by the Yugoslavian workers was well above
normal at an average of 683 rems. One person died, and
the seven others were treated and apparently suffered no
complications. No material escaped the facility.
Three Mile Island, Goldsboro, PA - March 28,
1979. The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) number
two reactor resulted from a series of equipment
malfunctions complicated by human misjudgement.
The story of TMI has been told and retold but the actual
series of events that culminated in the worst nuclear accident that this country has seen may never be fully
understood.
Three Mile Island reactor, completed in December
1978, is a pressurized water reactor that can produce 880
megawatts of power.
The accident apparently started when a turbine trip
let off nonradioactive steam into the outside atmosphere at 100 psi on the morning of March 28.
Events followed that led to what was termed a general
emergency at the plant. What followed was a general
state of confusion as well. Part of the confusion resulted
from the lack of direct authority for just such an
emergency. On the scene were representatives of various
government agencies, state regulators and assorted
media personnel. Reports were handed down from the
Pennsylvania governor's office, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's crisis response center, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources, Metropolitan
Edison (who operated the plant), Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (a division of NRC), Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and various other groups. This
left the people in the surrounding areas with virtually no
real center of authority to turn to for recommendations
during the crisis time. A warning from 1961 rang true:
"An accident of the type at Windscale, followed by indecision and vacillating directives could do irreparable
harm to the nuclear energy program in the United
States" (Ward 1961).
Equipment failures and operator errors resulted in
coolant levels in the pressure vessel falling below the top
of the core, resulting in its serious overheating. Claims
abounded that the core would melt down, expelling
massive amounts of radioactive materials onto the surrounding area. Further reports concluded that even if
the core had melted down, it "would probably solidify
before it melted through the TMI concrete foundation,
and even if it didn't, the bedrock underneath would be

sidered along with other options based on risks and costs.
Perhaps the consequences of not having nuclear power
reactors should also be very carefully considered and
weighed. Resistance to technological advances is not
new. Simon (1980) suggests that phony bad news and
false statements may be made for a number of reasons.
These include selling of books, newspapers, magazines,
obtaining of funds for research efforts, and to strive for
an unrealistic idealistic utopian state of affairs.
The purposes of this report are (1) to assess the impact of nuclear power reactor accidents on agriculture
using the Three Mile Island accident as a model; (2) to
place nuclear power reactor risks into proper perspective with other risks; and (3) to propose plans of action
for the agricultural industry if Protective Action Guides
are exceeded.

HISTORY OF
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR
ACCIDENTS
Windscale Atomic Pile No.1 - October 10, 1957. Inadequate instrumentation for maintenance operations
and poor judgement on the part of the operating staff
combined to cause an ov~rheating accident at the No. 1
atomic pile of the plutonium-producing facility at
Windscale, England (Bishop 1959; Anon. 1957).
Workers who were in the immediate facility were
tested and observed after the accident. For the 13 week
reading on dosimeter badges, which included the time of
the accident, only 14 workers directly associated with
the accident exceeded the maximum permissible level of
irradiation. The International Commissin on Radiation
Protection (ICRP) tolerance level for 13 weeks was then
3.0 r. The highest figure measured from the badges was
4.66 r (Anon. 1957). Per thyroid the highest level was
only 0.5 uCi. A report to the British Parliament shortly
after the accident said: "Since iodine has a short life
some increase over the ICRP level can properly be made
if the dose occurs on a single occasion" (Anon. 1957).
Public concern mounted and precautions were taken
to ensure uncontaminated food supplies. In order to
protect children from possible contamination with fission products released from the accident, milk supplies
in the area were condemned for human consumption if
samples showed 0.1 uCi/liter
of radioiodine
(Chamberlain and Dunster 1958; Anon. 1957). Milk
distribution was under restriction for two to five weeks
in a coastal area near the accident about 30 miles long,
10 miles wide at one end and six miles at the other end
(Anon. 1957; Ward 1961). Other sources of possible
contamination were checked in the area and found not
to be harmful, and thus no restrictions were placed on
any of these (Anon. 1957; Chamberlain and Dunster
1958).
The report to the British Parliament said, "We feel
that we can justifiably say that it is in the highest degree
unlikely that any harm has been done to the health of
anybody in the course of this incident" (Anon. 1957).
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an effective block" (Burnett 1980). If a meltdown were
to happen the fissionable material would be in a less
condensed mass so this would reduce the fission rate
and in turn reduce the temperature.
As it happened the core was severely damaged but
didn't melt down. There were releases of radioactive
gases from the TMI facility in the form of xenon-133
and krypton-85, noble gases which are not retained in
the human body. About 15 Ci of radioactive iodine was
released into the atmosphere. "The health effects of this
iodine were insignificant" (Burnett 1980). Sampling at
375 kilometers of the air mass containing gas released
from the TMI plant showed that the "whole-body dose
to an individual ... from exposure to gamma rays and
X-rays from the passing xenon-133 ...
was 0.004
mrem" which is about 0.004 percent of the amount
received from natural sources (Wahlen et 01. 1980).
The facility is located in the middle of the Susquehanna River just south of the state capital of Harrisburg. In
this area there are over 100 dairy farms within 50 miles
of the plant. There was a total of 8,490 dairy cattle,
1,880 beef cattle, 475 swine, 100 sheep, 70 horses and 18
goats on 100 farms surveyed by the Pennsylvania
Department of Agriculture in May following the accident (Halsey 1980b). There are 630,000 people in a
20-mile radius of the plant.
Because of concern that there might be iodine-131 in
the air, testing of milk was started the day of the accident. During the first crucial days following the accident, tests were conducted on 50 dairy farms within 35
miles of the plant. Sampling was done by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's Division of Milk
Sanitation. Two gallons of milk were taken from each
dairy for testing by the Bureau of Radiation Protection
and by the Food and Drug Administration. Milk was
also checked at 26 dairy processors (Halsey 1980a).
Early milk tests showed insignificant amounts of
radioisotopes. Final testing of the fresh milk revealed a
range from 16 to 41 picocuries per liter (Halsey 1980a).
This amount was significantly below the 12,000
picocuries per liter at which milk is considered unsafe to
drink and the 400 picocuries per liter in Pennsylvania
from the 1976 China tests (Krieg 1979).
Precautionary measures were taken to prevent contamination. Farmers were advised to put their animals
in barns and give stored feed although most cows were
still in barns from winter (Krieg 1979). The stored feed
would not have been contaminated by effluents from
TMI. [Testing of vegetables and soil samples revealed
no traces of radioisotopes from TMI (Krieg 1979»).
In a survey conducted by the editor of Dairy Herd
Management magazine of their readers in the sevencounty area surrounding TMI, only one percent of the
respondents moved their cows to another location during the height of the crisis. Ninety-three percent didn't
even consider moving them. Only one percent of the
dairymen dumped any milk because of the accident
(Halsey 1980b).
Although the milk was considered safe to drink, some
consumers in neighboring states were wary of milk products from the TMI area. Grocery stores put up signs

advertising their milk came from other areas and sales
of bottled water increased also as consumers received
daily doses of new terrors via media broadcasts and
publications. Of farmers surveyed in the area, 69 percent said they felt the media overplayed the incident and
68 percent said they thought their milk sales werehurt by
TMI plant shutdown (Halsey 1980b).
Bill Fouse, head of Pennsylvania Division of Milk
Sanitation, who was in charge of inspection and quality
assurance during the accident, summed up the attitude
of many farmers toward the TMI accident and the
energy situation as a whole with this statement: "I think
the farmer will probably think more rationally than any
other segment of society" (Halsey 1980a).
The special Kemeny Commission concluded that in
spite of the serious damage to TMI plant that actual
release of radioactivity will have a negligible effect on
individuals. Mental stress was the main effect!

POSSIBLE
RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION

7

Sources. It is very important in discussing radiation to
remember that radioactivity is not a new creation. It occurs naturally and for over 50 years man has used it for
his own purposes. Naturally-occurring radioactivity can
be found in the earth's crust, building materials, drinking water, space, people and animals (Lenihan 1959).
All species have evolved with radiation from cosmic
rays and radioactive minerals. Man, too, has developed
with different levels of natural radiation found
throughout the world.
In southwest France, natural radioactivity exposure
from two natural uranium isotopes exceeds 100 rads a
year (Leonard et 01. 1979). This area in southern France
and in northern Italy is known for its health spas that
advertise curative powers from mud and waters that are
high in alpha rays. These centers command high prices
and send out many pleased customers who claim
benefits from the naturally-occurring
radiation
(Hollander 1980).
Areas of the United States also are naturally high in
radiation. In Denver, for example, estimates are from
130 to 230 millirem per person per year; for the whole
ct>Untry, 80 to 105 millirem. In addition to this
background radiation, other sources contribute to total
yearly dosage. Medical treatments add an average of
another 70 millirems to the total per person per year
(EPA 1977; Bodansky 1980).
If the nuclear power plant system in this country were
greatly expanded, the additional average dose above
background and all other sources would only be about
one millirem per person per year (Bodansky 1980).
Natural background radiation averages about 100 times
this level. At present the amount of radiation received
from nuclear power plants under normal conditions is
less than the amount of radionuclides emitted from
coal-fired power plants. In fact, a preliminary study hy
the Environmental Protection Agency rated coal up to

1

tration than the averages; anthracite from Pennsylvania
'I
was the highest in thorium, and lignite from the Gulf
I
States - Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi - was
highest in uranium (McBride et 01. 1978). All uranium
and thorium regardless of source is radioactive. Both of
these elements occur in several isotopic forms and their
radiation emissions vary in intensity, form and energy.
In view of these facts, the role of nuclear power must
be looked at in relation to other risks incurred in everyday life. Nuclear power itself has not only been shown
to be useful but it can also be harmful. The question of
radiation is not just one dealing with nuclear power
plants; it deals also with background, coal fired power
plants, medical X-rays, radiation treatments, jet flights,
cardiac pacemakers, watches, smoke detectors, artificial
teeth, and nuclear explosions (Haaland 1979).
Other than medical uses of ionizing radiation, most
of the experience with high levels of radiatipn has been
with radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear weapons
tests during the 1950s and 1960s - the Cold War
period. The United States did much of its testing at
Nevada Test Site and on small, uninhabited islands in
the Pacific Ocean, and some accidental exposure occurred. There were accidental exposures to residents on the
Marshall Islands on March I, 1954 when wind directions shifted unexpectedly and carried "significant
amounts of fallout" to the islands of Rongelap, Ailingnae and Utirik. The amounts of whole body gamma
radiation ranged from 175 r on Rongelap, 69 r on Ailingnae to 14 r on Utirik (Sutow et 01. 1965).
None of the residents or Utirik developed radiation
symptoms, but the residents of the other two islands
showed signs and later showed some latent effects of
their exposure.
Experimental procedures have shown varying effects
of radiation on animals. It is noteworthy that the
estimate given for the median lethal dose for man is
"300-500 rads for short-term total-body radiation"
(Hamilton 1963). A similar lethal dose (LD 50) applies
to animals as well (Bell 1971). Animal data is much
more extensive and some of it was obtained from
animals at Nevada Test Site.
Low Level Radiation Effects. The natural radiation
levels in southwest France in excess of 100 rads per year
were studied. Researchers found that an annual dose of
70 rads gamma rays per year to rabbits caused small increases in chromosome aberrations in the blood lymphcytes; while there was "no effect on the spermatozoa
of male mice similarly exposed, nor of their offspring"
(Leonard et 01. 1979). From these and similar studies, it
appears that chromosome aberrations are not indicative
of measurable damage to germ plasm which would
result in effects on offspring.
Extensive studies were conducted at the Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory with 44 generations of male mice.
These studies "failed to reveal any genetic effects from
large gonadal radiation doses" (Anon. 1966). This line
of mice received a total dose of 8,800 rads over the
44-generation period with "no demonstrable damage"
reported. As compared with the controls, the irradiated

80 times riskier than nuclear power reactors in terms of
the radionuclides given off during normal operation
(Agres 1980). The study suggested that there are
"greater risks to the public of developing cancer from
radionuclides emitted by coal-fired power plants than
by normally-operating nuclear plants." (Agres 1980).
Coal naturally contains very small amounts of U-238,
U-235, Th-232 and their radioactive daughters (McBride
et 01. 1978), along with sulfur, iron and moisture (Agres
1980). As coal is burned most of the mineral content is
turned to ash and slag. These waste forms contain most
of the radionuclides, but small amounts do manage to
escape into the atmosphere. These amounts depend
upon the "particulate control system, furnace design,
mineral content of the coal, and the existing emission
control standards." (Agres 1980). As more new scrubbing systems are put into use, the amounts of escaping
particulate matter are expected to decrease and the
adverse health effects are also expected to decrease.
However, the present figures for fatalities from coal are
higher than those for nuclear power (Bodansky 1980)
(table 1). This comparison is not intended to incriminate
coal for its very small amount of radioactivity but merely to demonstrate that there are sources of radioactivity
in addition to that contributed by nuclear power plants.
Coal from different parts of the country contains
various levels of radionuclides. Coal types from all parts
of the United States averaged one part per million for
uranium and two ppm for thorium (McBride et 01.
1978). Some coals were 10 to 40 times higher in concen-

Table 1. Estimated annual fatalities resulting routinely
from the generation of one GW -year of electricity, in
cQal-fired and nuclear plants. The estimates include the
complete fuel cycle excluding reactor accidents.
Bodansky, 1980)
Fatalities
per GW-year

Cause

Accidents, mining
Accidents, transportation
Total
Pollution, new plants with lime
scrubbers
Pollution, old plants, 3 percent sulfur
coal

0.8
1 to 2
2 to 3
0.007 to 17
3 to 170

Total Coal: 2 to 170
Nuclear Power
Nonradiation accidents (mining)
Radiation, occupational
Radiation, public
Total radiation

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.5

Total Nuclear: 0.9
8

mice showed no substantial differences in reproductive
life and overall life span, among other factors. Conclusions drawn from this study indicate that mutations in
sperm may in fact be induced, but the deviations were
probably fatal to the fertilized eggs (Anon. 1966).
After a five-year study, Shetland ponies irradiated
with a cumulative exposure of 650 r of whole-body gamma radiation were found, in general, "able to perform
work under the conditions of the experiment as efficiently as the non-irradiated ponies" (Brown 1975).
Numerous other studies have been conducted dealing
with effects of high and low levels of radiation. Since
"risk may be looked upon as the probability of the occurrence of some unfavorable event" (Wodicka 1980),
the risk of operating a nuclear reactor power plant must
be considered in relation to other risks encountered in
everyday life.
Nuclear Reactor Accidents. There are four general
classifications of nuclear power reactor accidents as
defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
notification of unusual event, alert, site emergency, and
general emergency (table 2).
Thus, in terms of specific accidents, there are some
types that can occur. The two types of concern from the
public standpoint are loss of coolant accidents (LOCA)
and fuel meltdowns.
"It now seems probable that the worst possible accident from the point of view of the exposure to the public
to ionizing radiation is not a runaway nuclear reaction,
but a loss of coolant accident," said Professor Richard
Wilson in 1973. He explained that the accident could
happen if the cooling system in the reactor vessel or
steam piping failed. Even though the nuclear reaction
would stop as soon as the moderator (the coolant)
disappeared, heat would continue to be produced, leaving the core uncooled, unprotected and with the
possibility of meltdown (Wilson 1973).
A meltdown could ocur "if no steps were taken to reestablish core cooling" (Wilson 1973). In both the
Kemeny Commission Report (the President's special
committee charged with investigating the Three Mile
Island incident) and the Rogovin Report (the NRC's inquiry of TMI) conclusions were drawn that a core
meltdown would probably not have gone through the
containment building and even if it did, either the
bedrock or the soil below the facility would not have
allowed the melted core to go anywhere (Burnett 1980).
The question of explosions in nuclear power reactors
is one of little concern. In 1969, Dr. Karl Z. Morgan,
then director of Health Physics Division of Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, said, "At this point, I would like
to make it very clear that nuclear explosions (weapons
type) are impossible in nuclear power reactors"
(Morgan 1969). Earlier, in 1965, Dr. A. B. Park of
Agricultural Research with USDA told a veterinary
medical convention that if an explosion did occur, it
would "be about the same explosive hazard as a boiler
blowing up" (Park and Todd 1965).
A Kemeny conclusion was that at TMI the hydrogen
bubble inside the pressure vessel could not have explod-

Table 2. Classification of Nuclear Power Reactor
Accidents (Grimes and Ryan 1980)

Class
Class I:
Notification
of an unusual

Class
description

Release
potential

Expected
frequency

Unusual events
are in process

No releases of
radioactive material requir-

Once or twice

or have occurred which indi-

event

cate a potential degradadation of the
level of safety
of the plant.

per year per
unit.

ing offsite response or monitoring are expected unless
further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Class 2:
Events are in
process or have

Alert

occurred which
involve an actual or potential substantial degradation
of the level of

Limited

releases

of up to 10 Ci
of 1-131 equiv-

Once in 10 to
100 years per
unit.

alent or up to
104 Ci of Xe133 equivalent.

safety of the
plant.
Class 3:
Site
emergency

Events are in
process or have
occurred which
involve actual
or likely major
failures

of

Releases of up
to 100 Ci of 1131 equivalent
or up to 106 Ci
of Xe-133 equivalent.

Once in one
hundred to
once in 5000
years per
unit.

plant functions
needed for protection

of the

public.
Class 4:
General
emergency

Events are in
process or have
occurred which

Releases of
more than 1000

involve actual

equivalent or
more than 106
Ci of Xe-l33
equivalent.

or imminent
substantial core
degradation
or
melting with
potential

for

Ci of 1-131

Less than once
in about 5000
years per unit.
Life threatening doses offsite (within 10
miles) once in
about 100.000
years per unit.

loss of containment integrity.

ed or ruptured the presure vessel (Burnett 1980).
Nuclear reactors are designed so that it is impossible for
them to explode like an atomic bomb (Kemeny 1979).
The following table (table 3) includes estimates for
airborne activity that could be available for release from
containment in the event of some types of accident sequences.

POSSIBLE FOOD CHAIN
CONTAMINATION
Dairy cows play an important link in the human food
chain by supplying nutrients, using sources of nutrients
that humans can't directly use and filtering out
9
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The peak concentration of 131I from a single dose occurs about one day after the intake. If cows are allowed
to remain on contaminated pasture, the peak level will
be reached in three days (Comar 1965). Still, the amount
that is passed on in milk is less than the cow received.
"Under conditions of oral in~estion, about eight percent of the daily intake of 1 1I is secreted into each
day's milk" (Comar 1965).
The physical half-life of 131I is eight days, but experimental work has shown that on undisturbed pasture
it may vary from three to six days - usually occurring
at five days - for the biological half-life (Sasser and
Hawley 1966). Dilution of the 131I could be from rain-

undesirables from the diet.
Iodine. Iodine, essential to the thyroid gland function, is usually present in the thyroid equal to the
amount in the diet (Miller et al. 1975). Feeding excess
iodine, however, increased iodine excretion with some
increase in thyroid iodine. Iodine losses from normal intake include 30 percent of the intake lost in feces, 40
percent in urine and eight percent in milk. (Dairy cows
secrete less iodine in milk than most other species.)
Cows have different levels of iodine in their milk at different stages of lactation with a higher percent dose per
liter occurring in the later stages. However, a mixed
herd of cows will be at different stages and this will not
play an important part in the level of radioiodine in the

Table 3. Comparison of Kemeny Commission estimate for postulated meltdown with
"design basis" LOCA and with Rasmussen (Burnett 1980)
Percent

Time (1)

"Design Basis" LOCA
No meltdown, TIb releases

0

Xe-Kr
100070

1 hr

100070

Rasmussen Release
to Atmosphere
Worst containment
failure (PWR-Y2)
Containment leak,
no spray (PWR-4)
Containment leak,
spray (PWR-5)
Kemeny Estimates for
TMI
Postulated Meltdown
(4) (Airbourne activity in containment building)

Max.
1 hr
6 hr
24 hr
240 hr

of core fission product

Org. I

I

Inventory

that Is alrbourne

Cs-Rb

Te-Sb

Sr-Ba

Ru(2)

La(3)

25OJo
0.25070

90070

0.7070

70070

50070

40070

6070

40070

O.4l1Jo

60

0.2

9.

4.

3.

0.5

.3

0.04

30

0.2

3.

0.9

0.5

0.1

0.06

0.007

100070
100070
l00llJo
l00llJo
100070

0.001-0.2
0.001-0.2
0.001-0.2
0.0006-0.1
10-8_10-6

3.
0.4

1.
1.

0.09
0.03
0.0002

0.1
10-4
10-4

5.
5.
0.6
5xlO-4
5xlO-4

0.06
0.06
0.008
6xlO-6
6xlO-6

0.3
0.3
0.04
3xlO-s
3xlO-5

6xlO-5
6xlO-5
7xlO-6
6xlO-9
6xlO-9

(3hncludes Nd. Y, Ce, Pro Nb. Am. Cm. Pu, Np. Zr

-{.1)Timeafter release into the containment. For Kemeny work, release into containment was taken at the time the core melted through' the
reactor vessel (7 hours after the beginning of the accident, and 4 hours
after the start of fuel melting).

(4)Compiled from Kemeny "Technical Staff Analysis Report on
Alternate Event Sequences, •• Appendix E "Fission Products Inventory Within the Containment ••• and Appendix G "Analysis of Fission
Product Release to the Containment Atmosphere."

(2hncludes Mo, Rh, Tc. Co

milk (Tamplin 1965). Even after secretion into the mammary gland much of the iodine is available for resorption (Miller et al. 1975).
Radioisotopes of iodine would be the main concern
from a nuclear reactor with 131I as the predominant
one. Contaminated fresh milk is the main contributor of
131I to the human diet. Inhalation of 131I and consumption of unwashed, contaminated vegetables and
fruits would not be expected to be a significant problem.
In the case of commercially produced fruits and
vegetables, the transit time from harvest to consumer is
long enough to remove large amounts of the isotope.
Milk, on the other hand, is of major concern because of
its short market time.

fall, wind, mechanical disturbance or new growth.
Swedish researchers found that of the iodine-131
deposited on pasture area considerable volatilization occurred before the cows were even put on the pasture.
Between the time the pasture was sprayed and the time
cows were placed on it to graze (18 hours) about 60 percent of the iodine-131 deposited had disappeared. While
the cows were grazing over the next three days an additional six percent disappeared: thus, about two percent
was eaten by the cows (Auraldsson et al. 1971).
Since many dairy cattle are only on pasture during
their dry period, the possibility of contamination is
greatly reduced. However, it must be considered that
10
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some cows could receive contaminating
doses of
radioiodine and pass it on in milk.
Radioiodine may get into the cow diet via ingestion of
contaminated
pasture, contaminated
feed, water or
other means. The exposure from inhalation
is considered minimal to zero (Thompson 1967). Once cows
are removed from contaminated
pasture, the level of
contamination
in milk will drop rapidly. Water from
cisterns or ponds could supply some iodine but less than
pastures.
Exposed cattle may be fed massive doses of stable
iodine to reduce the 131 I content in milk. Feeding 1.3 g
reduced the level in milk by one-third and 2.0 g reduced
it one-half when fed daily on experiment (Miller et al.
1975). Cattle other than lactating cows are of no real
concern to the food chain with respect to iodine- 131 due
to the decay of radioactive iodine and to the delay time
from grazing cattle to meat consumption.
Radioiodine contamination
of fresh vegetables and
fruits is not a problem with commercially-produced
foods because of the transit time from harvest to maket.
However, home gardens could supply contaminated
foodstuffs from radioactivity deposited on the surface
of leafy vegetables. These vegetables, because of their
proximity to the consumers,
may undergo only a
24-hour holding period (or less) before they are used
(Thompson 1967). This time period does not allow for
sufficient radioactive decay of 131 I. Direct consumption of 131 I in water might be a problem in cisterns but
not for wells and treated municipal water supplies.
Strontium. Biological organisms discriminate against
strontium-90 in preference for calcium. Strontium-90
can enter plants both by uptake through the roots and
by absorption after deposition on plant surfaces. The
absorption of the Ca and 90Sr from soils is influenced
by clay content, humus content, pH, moisture level,
concentration of electrolytes and the calcium already in
the soil (Comar 1965). Strontium will more likely be
taken up in soils that have a low level of calcium
(Lenihan 1959).
The amount of contamination
that a cow passes along
in her milk will be much less than the amount ingested,
for she "always puts into milk less of the strontium than
the calcium that is in the ration" (Comar 1965).
Strontium-89, with a much shortened half-life of 50
days, moves through the food chain like strontium-90,
but in an abbreviated version.
Cesium. Cesium-l37 enters plants by direct contamination and can, therefore, be easily removed from
plants by rainfall. Almost none of the cesium is taken
up from the soil, probably because of the "fixation in
the lattice structure of clay minerals."
Once in an animal's body, cesium-137 is metabolized
like potassium and moves through the gastrointestinal
tract and on to the muscle tissues (Anon. 1960a). In lactating animals, the cesium passes on through to milk,
also. As a result, most of the contamination
to the
human food supply is from milk and meat (Eisenbud
1963).
Plutonium, Krypton and Xenon. "Experiments

showed that, following ingestion by a cow of a soluble
form of plutonium, less than .0ססoo1070 of the dose per
liter was secreted into milk" (Comar 1%5). Practically
none of plutonium ingested is absorbed and 99.99010 is
excreted in the feces.
Krypton and xenon are inert gases which are poorly
soluble in water and tissues (Sagan 1974). From table 4
it is evident that the annual doses of krypton-85 are
small and are estimated to continue to remain insignificant. In addition, the importance of cumulative doses in
the population
is marginal (Eichholz 1976). When
Table 4. Estimated annual doses to the U.S. population
from worldwide distribution of krypton-85
(Eichholz 1976)

Whole-body

Dose
Skin

I.ung

Year

(mrem/
person)

(mrem)

(mrem/
(person)

(mrem/
person)

1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

0.0001
0.0004
0.003
0.01
0.04

20
80
700
4,000
12,000

0.005
0.02
0.1
0.6
1.6

0.0002
0.006
0.005
0.02
0.06

released into the atmosphere, they mix completely with
the air which already contains one ppm krypton and 0.1
ppm xenon. Both of these inert gases are used in light
bulbs and xenon-133 is a radioactive gas used in cardiac,
blood flow and pulmonary function studies (Windholz
1976; United Nations 1977). Krypton has a biological
half-life of 18 hours; xenon, an average of seven hours
(Sagan 1974).

RECOMMENDATIONS
In the event of a nuclear power reactor accident that
releases fission products into the atmosphere, precautions should be known and action taken at the appropriate time. Emotionalism
has no place in the rational control of contamination
of our foods. Some
recommendations
may not apply to everyone as
geographic differences and climatic limitations often
dictate actions more than do desires. Measures to deal
with a possible contamination
are given, including the
Protective Action Guides (PAGs) set up by the federal
government.
Soil. Soil would not be of immediate concern but proper management procedures could do a great deal to
reduce a problem should it occur. The addition of lime
to calcium-poor soils can reduce the uptake into plants
of such radionuclides as strontium-90 and strontium-89.
Vegetables. The greatest amount of contamination
reaches vegetables by direct contamination.
Rainfall
carries radio nuclides into cavities of the fresh leafy

vegetables and collects there. For commercially produced vegetables that have a waiting period between harvest
and market, this would not be a problem as far as some
contaminants
are concerned. With vegetables grown at
home, skins or outer leaves should be removed and the
remainder washed thoroughly.
Canning, freezing, or
other storage of vegetables would allow decay of shortlived radionuclides.
Grain. For grains, PAG action would probably never
be needed, but if so it should include milling and
polishing. Time from harvest to consumer would be an
important factor here for this, in many cases, may be
several months.
Milk. Lactating dairy cows currently on pasture
should be removed and fed uncontaminated
stored feed
and water. Silages or other feeds harvested and stored
before an accident would be acceptable. Milk should be
tested by an appropriate agency and their advice should
be followed. This would likely include diversion of milk
for manufacturing
purposes
or withholding
contaminating milk from market to allow for radioactive
decay. Milk could be frozen, concentrated,
dehydrated
or other methods used to allow this to occur. Methods
exist to remove radio nuclides from milk via ionexchange resin columns; however, to date this process
has not been commercially exploited on a large scale and
is available in only a few areas. The same principles
would be involved as discussed by Bell and Blake (1976)
for protection from fallout from nuclear weapons except weapons fallout would be much higher concentration of radioactivity covering much greater areas.
Meat. Meat and meat products would be considered
by a case-by-case evaluation according to the PAGs.
Eggs. As eggs would contribute minor amounts of
contamination
to the food chain, these would not be a
problem. Furthermore, chickens are housed in buildings
that could provide shielding from most aerial contamination and their feed likely would have been processed and stored before an accident.
General. If l31 I is the only radionuclide which exceeds PAGs, then storage until safe would be a solution
to this problem. Also, contaminated
food products
could be diverted and fed to livestock other than cows
producing milk.
Don't panic. Emotional outbursts by pseudoexperts
and unconfirmed
rumors should be ignored. Good
judgement should be used and local agricultural leaders
are easily in contact with radio nuclide experts. Food

producers are constantly challenged by emergency situations in their day-to-day operations and the response of
the agricultural community around TMI was very admirable.

SUMMARY
Nuclear power reactors are producing electricity in
the United States and throughout the world. From the
data available, the nuclear power reactor industry appears to be as safe if not safer than most other industries
for the production of electricity. A popular misconception is that nuclear reactors will explode like an atomic
bomb. Danger to humans appears to have been much
less than anticipated from the TMI accident. Protective
Action Guides (P AGs) have been established for action
in the event of major nuclear accidents. PAGs were not
exceeded at TMI. The possibility of major contamination of the agricultural community downwind from a
nuclear power plant appears to be unlikely. In the event
of action on P AGs, radioactive
isotopes of iodine
through the food chain to humans are the radioactive
isotopes of primary concern. These could enter by way
of milk from grazing cows and from fresh leafy
vegetables produced
downwind
from the accident.
Other routes of entry are not worth considering.
Radioactive cesium could be volatilized but not to the
extent of iodine. Radioactive strontium is less apt to be
released. The noble gases krypton and xenon and the
heavy metals such as uranium and plutonium are not
absorbed and retained by humans and animals so they
are of no real threat to agricultural
food chains to
humans.
Countermeasures
for the agricultural
community
would consist of removing all milk-producing
animals
from pasture and giving stored feed where PAG action
is required. Milk above safe levels would be stored until
safe, diverted to other uses or simply dispersed with
waste water. Fresh leafy vegetables could be washed,
outer leaves removed or destroyed if levels are unsafe.
Good judgement and a cool head would be helpful in
times when a few doomsday prophets are flooding the
media with rumors and data which are not applicable to
nuclear reactor accidents.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Background - the radiation in man's natural environment, including cosmic rays and radiation from the
naturally radioactive elements

Rad - the standard unit of absorbed dose, equal to
energy absorption of 100 ergs per gram (0.01 joule per
kilogram); supersedes the roentgen as the unit of dosage

Core - the active portion of a nuclear reactor, containing the fissionable material

Radioactive - giving off, or capable of giving off, radiant energy in the form of particles or rays, as alpha,
beta and gamma rays, by the spontaneous disintegration
of atomic nuclei

Critical - capable of sustaining a chain reaction at a
constant level

Radioactive decay - the spontaneous transformation
of a nuclide into one or more different nuclides, accompanied by either the emission of particles from the
nucleus, nuclear capture or ejection of orbital electrons,
or fission

Critical reactor - a nuclear reactor in which the ratio of
moderator to fuel is either subcritical or just critical
Curie (Ci) - the unit used in measuring radioactivity,
equal to the quantity of any radioactive material in
which the number of disintegrations per second is 3.7 x

Radioiostope - a naturally occurring or artificially
created radioactive isotope of a chemical element

1010

Dosimeter - an instrument that measures the total dose
of nuclear radiation received in a given period

Rem - a unit of ionizing radiation, equal to the amount
that produces the same damage to humans as one
roentgen of high-voltage X-rays; derived from roentgen
equivalent man (rem)

Fission - the splitting of an atomic nucleus into two
parts of approximately equal size, accompanid by the
conversion of part of the mass into energy

Roentgen - the international unit of quantity used in
measuring ionizing radiation, as X-rays or gamma rays,
equal to the quantity of radiation that will produce, in
0.001293 grams (1 cc) of dry air at DOCand 760 mm
mercury pressure, ions carrying one electrostatic unit of
electricity of either sign; abbreviated as R or r

Fission product - any radioactive or stable nuclide
resulting from fission, including both primary fission
fragments and their radioactive decay products
Lethal dose 50 (LD-50) - the dose of a substance which
is fatal to 50% of a specific group

Supercritical reactor - a nuclear reactor in which the
effective multiplication constant is greater than one and
consequently a reactor that is increasing its power level;
if uncontrolled, a supercritical reactor will undergo a
sudden and dangerous rise in power level

Metric abbreviations
1,000 millicuries (mCi) = I Ci (Curie)
1,000 microcuries (uCi) = 1 mCi
1,000 nanocuries (nCi) = I uCi
1,000 picocuries (pCi) = I nCi

Zero-power reactor - an experimental nuclear reactor
operated at low neutron flux and at a power level so low
that no forced cooling is required; fission product activity in the fuel is then sufficiently low to permit handling of the fuel after use

Nuclear reactor - a device containing fissionable
material in sufficient quantity and so arranged as to be
capable of maintaining a controlled, self-sustaining
nuclear fission chain reaction
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